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WANT OF TRUSTEE AS AFFECTING THE
CREATION OF TRUSTS
ARTHUR YAO*
Suppose A dies leaving a will in which he left the bulk of his estate
"in trust for B." A's intention to create a trust is clear. It is equally
clear that B was to be the beneficiary. The only element lacking is the
appointment of a trustee. Is a trust-in this case, a testamentary trust
-- created? Is it essential to the creation of a trust that the testator
name a trustee, in whom the title to the trust property is vested? The
courts have generally upheld such a trust relying on an oft-repeated
rule of equity that "a trust will not be allowed to fail for want of a
trustee, even though none be named."'
Want of a trustee may occur in a conveyance by will; it may also
occur in a conveyance inter vivos. It is equally true that want of a
trustee may assume a great variety of forms. There may be no trustee
because none is named, or because, though one is named, he subsequently resigns or dies. In other words, want of a trustee may occur
initially or subsequently. This article is not concerned with situations
in which a vacancy in trusteeship occurs as a result of the disclaimer,
resignation, death or removal of a named trustee. Many states now have
statutes expressly authorizing the court to appoint a new trustee in any
2
of these situations.
Initial failure may occur where no trustee is named by the settlor, or
where a trustee, although having been named, predeceases the settlor or
is incapable of taking title to the property. It is this kind of want of
trustee that this article is concerned with. Eminent writers have disProfessor of Law, St. Mary's University. LL.B., Soochow University; LL.M., S.J.D
University of Michigan; Kings College, London.
1 In re McCray's Estate, 268 P. 647, 648 (Cal. 1928).
2 See 2 Sco-rr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 108.2 n.15 (3d ed. 1967) for these statutes.
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cussed the law on this subject." Section 32(2) of the Restatement provides:
If the conveyance is ineffective only because no trustee is named in
the instrument of conveyance or because the person named as
incapable of taking title to the proptrustee is dead or otherwise
4
created.
is
trust
a
erty,
As to testamentary trusts, Section 33 of the Restatement provides:
If the owner of property devises or bequeaths the property in trust,
a trust may arise although no trustee is named in the will, or the
person named as trustee is dead or otherwise incapable of taking
title to the property.5
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS

While it may be desirable to name a trustee in the will, this is not
essential. It is well settled that a testamentary trust will not fail for
want of a trustee. It is immaterial whether the intended trust is for a
charitable purpose or for the benefit of individuals. As long as the
testator's intention is clearly manifested in the will, equity will enforce
it regardless of the cause of the failure of trustee. "That the testator
named no trustee will not prevent the execution of the trust, for the
court will appoint a trustee wherever necessary to sustain the trust, and
a trustee will be appointed."6 Thus, equity will appoint a trustee if
none is named in the will, 7 or if the person named as trustee predeceases

the testator 8 or is otherwise incapable of holding title to the property. 9
81 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TausTEms §§ 123-127 (2d ed. 1965); 1 ScoTr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 32.3, § 33 (3d ed. 1967).
4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 32(2) (1959).
5 Id. § 33.
6 Hiles v. Garrison, 62 A. 865 (N.J. Eq. 1906).
7 In re Harber's Estate, 409 P.2d 31 (Ariz. 1965); In re McCray's Estate, 268 P. 647
(Cal. 1928); In re Estate of Thomason, 54 Cal. Rptr. 229 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); In re
McKenzie's Estate, 38 Cal. Rptr. 496 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Jeffreys v. International
Trust Co., 48 P.2d 1019 (Colo. 1935); Goldstein v. Handley, 60 N.E.2d 851 (Il. 1945);
McCartney v. Jacobs, 123 N.E. 557 (Ill. 1919); Smallwood v. Soutter, 125 N.E.2d 679 (I1.
App. Ct. 1955); In re Walden's Estate, 180 N.W. 679 (Iowa 1920); Green's Adm'rs v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 120 S.W. 283 (Ky. 1909); Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore, 185 A. 335 (Md. 1936); Webber Hospital Ass'n. v. McKenzie, 71 A. 1032 (Md.
1908); Hull v. Adams, 190 N.E. 510 (Mass. 1934); In re Estate of Hall, 193 So. 2d 587
(Miss. 1967); Hiles v. Garrison, 62 A. 865 (N.J. Eq. 1906); Ladies' Benevolent Soc. v. Orrell,
142 S.E. 493 (N.C. 1928); In re Harris, 142 A. 374 (R.I. 1928); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440
S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Taysum v. El Paso Nat.
Bank, 256 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1952, writ ref'd).
8 First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hull, 280 N.W. 531 (Iowa 1938); Brook v.
Conkwright, 200 N.W. 692 (Ky. 1918).
9 Burke v. Burke, 102 N.E. 293 (Ill. 1913); Eckles v. Lounsberry, 111 N.W. 2d 638
(Iowa 1961); Childs v. Waite, 67 A. 311 (Me. 1907); Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Met. 378 (Mass.
1842); Sheldon v. Chappell, 47 Hun. 59 (N.Y. 1888); Willis v. Alvey, 69 S.W. 1035 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1902).
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Where circumstances require the court may even compel the heirs or
personal representatives of the testator to convey the property to the
trustee so appointed.
Section 33 of the Restatement is widely accepted by the courts. Much
can be said in support of the general rule that equity will not allow a
testamentary trust to fail for want of a trustee. If the intended trust
is not upheld, the property goes to the heirs or personal representatives
of the testator. Since the testator has manifested his intention that the
beneficiaries should have the property, it would be unjust enrichment
to the heirs or personal representatives if they were allowed to keep the
property free of trust.
INTER

Vivos

TRUSTS

It has long been settled that failure of a trustee after the creation of
an inter vivos trust will not affect the trust except in the rare situation
where the settlor manifests an intention that the named trustee personally and no other shall administer the trust. A trust once validly
created will not fail merely because of the subsequent failure of the
trustee. Today, by statutes in many states the court is empowered to
appoint a new trustee in such a situation and vest title to the property
in him.' 0
A more difficult question arises where there is an initial failure of
the trustee, such as where no trustee is named in the trust instrument,
or where the person named as trustee is incapable of taking title to the
property or dies before the execution of the instrument. The question
here is whether there is a trust. In jurisdictions where an inter vivos
trust is revocable by the settlor, unless made irrevocable by the terms
of the instrument, the question is not important.' Even if the trust is
held to have been created in spite of the failure of appointment of a
trustee, the settlor may revoke it. Where the trust is irrevocable, either
because of a failure to reserve a power of revocation, as in many jurisdictions or because of an express provision of irrevocability as in Texas,
it is pertinent to determine whether a trust is created in spite of an
initial failure of trustee.
If there is an intended transfer in trust by deed, no trust is created
when the deed is defective. An effective delivery is required or the trust
fails with title remaining in the donor free of trust. He does not hold
10 2 ScoTr, TiE LAW OF TRUSTS § 108.2 n.15 (3d ed. 1967).
11 CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 2280 (Deering 1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.41
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art.- 7425b-41 (1960).
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the property in express trust for the intended beneficiary because he
does not intend to be the trustee himself. Nor does he hold it in constructive trust because he is not thereby unjustly enriched. The intended gift in trust fails simply because he has not made an effective
conveyance.
If the deed is defective only because no trustee is named in the trust
instrument or because the person named as trustee is dead or otherwise
incapable of taking title to the property, the Restatement espouses
the view that a trust is created.' 2 Professor Bogert supports it in the
following words:
There is some authority to the effect that a deed intended to create
a trust, which leaves out the name of the trustee or names a nonexistent person or corporation, passes an equitable interest to the
named beneficiaries and creates a trust with the settlor as trustee
of the legal estate. The theory often cited is that a trust is not to
fail for want of a trustee. However, this may mean that the trust
is not to fail because of the loss of the trustee after its creation,
or the theory may imply that the trust is not to fail in its origin for
8
want of a trustee. Nevertheless, in either case the result is sound.'
It seems timely, therefore, to examine the cases in which the question
was raised and decided and to compare them with the provision of the
Restatement.
When the donor is dead, courts generally uphold the trust without
regard to the manner in which the failure of trustee occurs. The difficulty lies where the donor is still alive and the trust instrument which
purports to transfer property to a trustee fails to name the trustee or
names one who is either nonexistent or otherwise incapable of taking
title to the property. For purposes of discussion, it is assumed that the
trust instrument is defective only because of these indicated circumstances. In such a case it is clear that the title to the property remains
with the donor and the question is whether he holds it in trust for the
intended beneficiary. The view of the Restatement concedes that there
is no express trust, but holds the donor as a constructive trustee. In a
comment to Section 32(2), the reporter says:
Although the owner does not become an express trustee because he
did not intend to become trustee, he is chargeable as a constructive
trustee and he may be compelled by a suit in equity by the beneficiary to transfer the property to a new trustee to be appointed, to
be held by him in trust for the beneficiary, or if the intended trust
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusts § 32(2) (1959).
§ 128
18 1 BoGRT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRusra_
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is one which by the terms of the trust or otherwise the beneficiary
can terminate at will ....
to transfer the property directly to the
beneficiary. If the settlor dies, the person14succeeding to his interest
can be compelled to make such transfer.
Certain situations involving the failure to designate a trustee in the
instrument should be distinguished from the problem which is the
principal topic of discussion in this article. If there are circumstances
clearly indicating that the intended gift in trust is not to fail because
no trustee is named, then a trust is created. Thus, in Burnside v. Wayman,15 a deed of trust was made without naming a trustee, but a blank
was left in which to insert the name. There was evidence that the
grantor gave the beneficiary authority to select a trustee and fill in the
name. It was held that the trust did not fail for want of a trustee and
that the beneficiary could appoint one and fill in the blank or, in default thereof, a court of equity had the authority to supply the name
of the trustee. When the name of the grantee is left blank in a deed,
ordinarily the court has no power to supply the name necessary to complete the instrument. However, where a grantor delivers a deed with
the name of the grantee in blank, intending that the title is to vest in
the person to whom the deed is delivered, and that person is expressly
authorized at the time of delivery to insert his own or any other name
as grantee, an irrevocable power coupled with an interest is vested in
the person to whom the deed is delivered.
Again, in Smith v. Davis,16 two owners executed a deed conveying
certain land to a corporation in trust for certain specified purposes. The
deed provided that "the trust hereby created shall not lapse or become
void by reason of the failure or refusal of the party of the third part
(meaning the trustee) to accept or carry out the same," and that, in
case the contingency should happen, a new trustee should be appointed
by the mutual consent of the parties or by a court of competent jurisdiction. The corporate trustee subsequently found out that it was
without power to act as trustee on the ground that it was incapable of
taking title sought to be conveyed. One of the grantors filed suit for
appointment of a new trustee, which the court granted.
Sometimes circumstances may indicate that although the donor has
not appointed a trustee he intends to act in that capacity either indefinitely or until one is appointed. In such a situation there is no
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §

1549 Mo. 556(1872).

52 Comment i at 92 (1959).

16 27 P. 26 (Cal. 1891).
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want of trustee and, therefore, the trust is created. Thus, in Yandell v.
Wilson,'7 the holder of certain promissory notes gave them to a bank
to hold in trust for his daughter and granddaughter. The bank was not
authorized under its charter to act as trustee and was without authority
under the law to do so. Until his death the donor had on different
occasions acknowledged the gift, collected the interest when due, and
remitted the same to his daughter and granddaughter. Upon his death
the notes were found in his private lock box. It is evident that he had
re-acquired the possession of the notes from the bank, although when
such re-acquisition took place was not known. In a suit by the donor's
daughter and granddaughter against his executors, the court allowed
the plaintiffs to recover the amount of the notes. The decision in this
case is sound since there was no want of trustee. Although the donor
had ineffectually appointed a trustee, he had, by collecting the interest
and remitting the same to the beneficiaries, "assumed to act and constituted himself the trustee with the acquiescence of the beneficiaries of
the trust, thereby creating the relationship of trustee and cestuis que
trustent between himself and the owners of the equitable and beneficial
interest in the notes."' 8
The basis of a constructive trust is unjust enrichment. Since the
donor receives no consideration, he is not unjustly enriched if he
retains the title to the property free of trust. The situation is different
after the donor's death. In such a case the property descends to his heirs
or next of kin who would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to
keep the property free of trust. Where there is an initial lack of trustee,
such as where no trustee is named or where, even though one is named,
he is dead or incapable of taking title to the property, the trust will fail
altogether as against the donor himself and his transferee, unless there
are special circumstances which require the enforcement of the intended
trust in order to do justice.
The main reason for support of the rule that a trust does not fail for
want of a trustee is that to permit the trust to fail would be contrary to
the intention of the donor in creating the trust. If his intention clearly
manifests that the trust will not fail because no trustee is named, as in
Burnside v. Wayman"9 and Smith v. Davis, 20 the trust will be upheld.
If circumstances indicate, as in Yandell v. Wilson,21 that the donor
17 183 So. 382 (Miss. 1938).

i8 Id.at 384.
1949 Mo. 356 (1872).
2027 P. 26 (Cal. 1891).
21

183 So. 382 (Miss. 1938).
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intends to hold the property as trustee for the intended beneficiary
pending the appointment of a new trustee, there is no doubt that a
trust is created. Where he names a person who is already dead as
trustee, it is clear that he does not intend to be the trustee himself. If
he executes a deed and leaves the name of the trustee in blank, a reasonable deduction, in absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, would be that he has not made up his mind as to the selection of a
trustee. It would be farfetched to say that the donor in such a case
intends to hold the property as trustee for the intended beneficiary
until a new trustee is appointed. For a person to make himself a trustee
there must be an express intention to become a trustee. However
anxious the court may be to carry out the donor's intention, it is not at
liberty to construe the terms of the instrument other than according to
their plain meaning. The fact that a donor makes out a trust instrument
to a person who is yet to be designated shows an intention to give the
property to another and not retain it as trustee.
The cases in which the question of want of trustee was raised and
decided fall into two main categories:
1. Cases in which the donor had died since the execution of the
trust instrument and the litigation was between his heirs or
executors and the intended beneficiaries.
2. Cases in which the donor himself or his transferee sought to set
aside the trust instrument or otherwise acted adversely to the
intended beneficiaries.
CASES IN WHICH THE LITIGATION ARISES AFTER THE

DEATH OF THE DONOR

Where litigation arises after the death of the donor the courts are
prone to uphold the trust even though the trust instrument is defective
for want of a grantee-trustee. Most of the cases falling into this category
involve suits for the enforcement of charitable trusts. This fact alone
furnishes the court a strong reason to enforce the trust. It is well settled
that gifts for charitable purposes are favored and will be liberally
construed in order to accomplish the intent of the donor. This is
especially true when the property has been used and money expended
on the faith of the gift during the lifetime of the donor.
In cases where the donor attempts to create a private trust, the court
is faced with the choice between the donor's heirs and the intended
beneficiary. If the trust is not upheld the result will be that the property will go to the donor's heirs. As between the donor's heirs and the
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intended beneficiary both of whom are not purchasers for value, it is
submitted that the latter has a better claim. Since the donor's intention to create a trust is clear, his failure to appoint a trustee during his
lifetime should not operate as a windfall to his heirs who would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to take the property free of trust. Although
the intended beneficiary cannot compel the donor to complete the
gift in trust, he may obtain the aid of the court to complete it as against
the donor's heirs by imposing a constructive trust upon the property.
In Beatty v. Kurtz,22 the donor set apart certain land for the sole use
and benefit of the German Lutheran Church of Georgetown. No conveyance of the lot was made because there was no church of that denomination in existence in that town, and, therefore, there was no
grantee. Shortly thereafter the Lutherans of Georgetown organized a
church, took possession of the land, and erected a building thereon for
public worship. Sixteen years after the donor's death, suit was brought
by the trustees of the German Lutheran Church against the donor's son
as his heir for quieting of title and for an injunction against disturbance by the defendant of the plaintiff's possession. In giving judgment
to the plaintiffs, the court said:
To be sure, if an unincorporated society of Lutherans had, upon
the faith of such donation, built a church thereon with the consent
of Beatty (the donor), that might furnish a strong ground, why a
court of equity should compel him to convey the same to trustees
in perpetuity for their use; or at least to execute a declaration of
trust, that he and his heirs should hold the same for their use. For
such conduct would amount to a contract with the persons so
building the church, that he would perfect the donation in their
favour; and a refusal to do it would be a fraud upon them, which a
Court of equity ought to redress .... 2. There is no pretence to say,
that the present appropriation was ever attempted to be withdrawn
by Charles Beatty during his lifetime, and he did not die until
about sixteen years ago .... We think, then, it might at all times
have been enforced as a charitable and pious use, through the intervention of the government as parens patriae, by its Attorney
General or other law officer. It was originally consecrated for a
religious purpose; it has become a depository of the dead;
and it
24
cannot now be resumed by the heirs of Charles Beatty.
The plaintiffs in the Beatty case had all the equity on their side.
They had during the lifetime of the donor, and evidently with his
222 Pet. 566 (1829).
23 Id. at 582.

24 Id.
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knowledge or consent, taken possession of the land and on the faith of
the donation expended money to carry out the very purposes for
which the donation was intended. This state of affairs existed at least
sixteen years before the death of the donor. He had never claimed the
lot as his property, but had it recorded with the city as a tax-exempt
property belonging to the church. If that is not sufficient, the donation
is for a charitable use which should be considered "as an exception to
the general rule requiring a particular grantee."
Bailey v. Kilburn25 is another case in which suit was brought after
the death of the donor. The decision was based on estoppel. In that
case Harvey executed a deed giving a portion of land "for the use of a
school house, if the neighboring inhabitants see cause to build a school
house thereon." The deed named no grantee. The inhabitants in the
neighborhood organized a school district, built a school house on the
land, and generally assumed ownership and management of the same.
The school house was subsequently removed and the land was leased to
the plaintiff for a term of ten years by one Brown acting as agent of the
school district. The plaintiff held over after the termination of the
term, and the school district authorized the defendant to enter on the
land and take possession thereof for the district. The plaintiff brought
an action of trespass and based his claim on his actual possession of the
land. The suit in this case was between the plaintiff who was the holdover lessee of the school district and the defendant whose entry upon
the land was authorized by the school district. In other words, both
parties based their respective claims from the same source, the school
district. This led the court to say that "[n]o principle is more clearly
established, than that a lessee, after enjoyment, cannot be permitted to
deny the lessor's title .... Nor is it necessary to prove that the agent
was duly appointed; for the plaintiff is estopped to deny it, for the same
reason by which he is estopped to deny the title of his lessors." 26 It
was only dictum when the court held that, although no legal estate
passed by the Harvey deed, a trust was created and that the court would
protect the trust and, if necessary, appoint a trustee to take the legal
estate from the donor's heirs.
In Visitors M.E. Church v. Town, 27 a deed conveyed land to certain
persons as trustees of a church and their successors in office, without
using the word "heirs." As the deed stands in its original form, the
25 10 Met. 176 (Mass. 1845).
26 Id. at 179.
27 20 A. 488 (NJ. Ct. of Ch. 1890).
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grantees had merely a life estate. After the death of the donor, the
church filed a suit in equity to reform the deed so as to pass a fee
simple estate and to enjoin the heirs of the donor from claiming the
land. The court granted the relief on the ground that the conveyance
was for a charitable purpose. The court further reasoned there was a
meritorious consideration because of religious instruction received
during the donor's lifetime.
The most frequently cited case in support of the rule that a trust
will not fail for want of a trustee is Wittmeier v. Heiligenstein.2 8 In
that case a woman executed a deed seeking to convey certain land to a
church. The deed contained a provision requiring the church to pay
a sum monthly to her husband after her death. Four days after the
execution of the deed she died, survived by brothers and sisters as her
heirs. The brothers and sisters filed a bill to set aside the deed on the
ground that the church, being unincorporated, could not take the property as grantee. Her ex-husband filed a cross-bill claiming that the
instrument, though void as a deed, nevertheless created a valid trust.
The court upheld the trust because equity does not allow a trust to
fail for want of a trustee. The suit was brought after the death of the
donor. There were circumstances in that case that would lend support
to the conclusion of the court. A substantial portion of the property
which the donor owned was acquired by her from her divorced husband. Her relation with her brothers and sisters was anything but
pleasant and cordial; she did not speak to them for years. She received
an anonymous letter warning her that her relatives were waiting to
get what she had. 29 Had the court refused to enforce the trust, the
persons to be benefited would be the very same persons whom the
donor tried not to benefit.
The same court rendered Stowell v. Prentisso three years after Wittmeier. In Stowell a man executed a deed conv .1g certain land containing a spring to "the directors of school disf
No. 1 in the town
of Hallcock .. . for the use of the public." The spring was practically
the only source of water supply in the territory and was used by the
residents in the vicinity without interruption for a long time after the
donor's death. Under Illinois law, school directors could not hold title
to property for other than school purposes. After the donor's death
28 139 N.E. 871 (Ill. 1923).
29 Heiligenstein v. Schlotterbeck, 133 N.E. 188 (111. 1921).
80

154 N.E. 120 (111. 1926).
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his executor conveyed the property to the defendant. A bill was brought
by the directors of the school district to quiet title, and to enjoin the
defendant from interfering with the public use and enjoyment of the
land. In granting the relief, the court said:
While, at law, gifts to charitable uses, without a certain and competent trustee to take and hold the title, may be void, yet a court
of equity will carry the trust into effect by appointing a trustee or
by itself acting in the place of a trustee. Equity will not permit a
trust otherwise valid to fail for want of a trustee or because the
trustee designated is incompetent to act. 8'
Great emphasis was placed on the finding that the intended conveyance was made for a charitable purpose and it was on this ground
that the trust was upheld even though no competent trustee was named.
In Shaw v. Johnson,3 2 a woman purchased a life insurance policy
and directed that the death benefits of the policy be paid to a certain
trust company in trust for her two named children. The policy permitted change of beneficiary by filing of a written notice by the insured, with such change to take effect only when and not until the
endorsement of the same was made on the policy by the insurance company. Several years later she revoked the trust and executed a new
trust deed naming a certain bank as trustee. The policy, the notice of
change of beneficiary and the trust deed were forwarded to the insurrance company for endorsement in accordance with the rules of the
company. Upon being notified of the appointment the bank refused
to accept unless the trust deed be re-drafted. While the re-drafting was
still undecided, the woman died. In a suit by her children against her
executor, the court held that the trust was enforceable and relied on
McCray33 (a case of disposition by will) for the proposition that a trust
should not fail for want of a trustee.
Two recent cases involving suits brought after the death of the donor
to determine whether a trust had been created when either no trustee
was named or the named trustee was incapable of taking title to the
property. 34 In both cases the court enforced the trust on the ground
that a charitable trust should not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee.
In all of the foregoing cases it is held that a trust does not fail for
811d. at 124.
59 P.2d 876 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
83268 P.. 647. (Cal. 1928).
34 Arnold v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 202 So. 2d 83 (Ala. 1967); Olivas v. Board of
Nat. Mis. of Presbyterian Church, 405 P.2d 481 (Ariz. 1965).
.32
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want of a trustee. There are certain factors common in all these cases:
the donor was dead at the time suit was brought; the donor during his
lifetime never attempted to withdraw the gift, nor did he manifest a
change of mind about it; the intended trust was either for a charitable
purpose or for the benefit of persons who were the natural objects of
his bounty. In such a situation it is clear that a court of equity should
enforce the trust against the heirs of the donor who would be unjustly
enriched if allowed to take the property free of trust.
There are a number of states which have a statute expressly providing that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee or that a trust may
exist even without any appointed trustee.85 In both types of legislation
the court is empowered to appoint a trustee and direct the execution
of the trust.
The Georgia code was cited in Dominy v. Stanley."6 In that case the
owner executed a deed purporting to convey certain real estate for
school purposes. No trustees were named in the deed. After the death
of the donor suit was brought to enforce a charitable trust against his
heirs. The court briefly referred to the statute, but rested its decision
mainly on the ground that the trust was for charity and the courts of
equity look with special favor upon such trusts.
Cases so far decided in these jurisdictions do not show that the statute has made any change in the law. 7 It is submitted that the statute
is to be construed not as an attempt to introduce fundamental change,
as ordinary enactments would be, but as an attempt to restate the law
in the general terms of a code. Indeed, in a comment to a similar Louisiana statute, the Louisiana State Law Institute reports that this section makes no change in the law. 8
35 GA. GEN. CODE, § 108-302 provides: "A trust shall not fail for want of a trustee."
Cal. statute provides: "When a trust exists without any appointed trustee, or where all
the trustees renounce, die, or are discharged, the superior court of the county where the

trust property or some portion thereof is situated, must appoint another trustee, and
direct the execution of the trust. The court may, in its discretion, appoint the original
number, or any less number of trustees."--CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 2289. Similar provision
is found in IDAHO CODE, § 68-101; MONT. REv. CODE, § 86-608; S.D. COM. LAWS, 1967,
§ 55-3-21. See also DEL. CODE, tit. 12, § 8509; LA. REV. STAT., § 9.1785; R.I. GEN. LAWS,
§18-2-1.

133 S.E. 245 (Ga. 1926).
Bethel Farm Bureau v. Anderson, 123 S.E. 2d 754, 757 (Ga. 1962), in which the
statute was cited, is a case of failure of trusteeship after the creation of the trust. The
court said: "And Code, § 108-302 declares that 'A charity shall never fail for the want
of a trustee.' "
For application of the statute to testamentary trusts, see In re Ingram's Estate, 285 P.
365 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1930); Simpson v. Anderson, 137 S.E. 2d 638 (Ga. 1964); Wood
v. Trustees of Fourth Baptist Church, 61 A. 279 (RI. 1905).
86
87

88 LA. REv.

STAT.,

Vol. 3-A, p. 53.
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CASES IN WHICH THE DONOR HIMSELF OR HIS TRANSFEREE SEEKS TO
SET ASIDE THE TRUST INSTRUMENT OR ACTS ADVERSELY
TO THE INTENDED BENEFICIARY

We have seen that if the litigation arises after the death of the donor,
the great majority of the courts have enforced the trust against his
heirs or next of kin. This is especially true when the trust is for a
charitable purpose or for the benefit of persons who are the natural
objects of bounty of the donor. There is, however, very little authority
on the question whether a trust arises as against the donor himself
where the deed which purports to be a conveyance in trust fails to
name the grantee-trustee or names one who is either dead or incapable
of taking title to the property.
In Kirk v. King39 a man conveyed land "to the employers of the
school at Plum Creek" to hold the same for an "English school house,
and no other purpose." A school house was built on the land but was
later abandoned. The donor subsequently sold the land to the defendant who entered upon it and removed the school house. There was
evidence that at the time of purchase the defendant had knowledge of
the dedication of the land for the use of a school. Plaintiffs brought
trespass against the defendant claiming that they resided in the neighborhood of the school and were heads of the families most likely to be
benefited by the school if one were kept in operation. In rendering
judgment for defendant, the court held that the conveyance "to the
employers of the school" was void for want of a grantee capable of taking. The court admitted that the trust would be enforced if the plaintiffs could "show such an equity as a chancellor would enforce." 40 The
trust in this case failed because no equity in favor of the plaintiffs was
shown.
Eyrick and Deppen v. Hetrick41 is not a case of initial failure of
trustee. An insane person was named as the trustee in the deed. An
insane person has capacity to take title to property, although he has no
capacity to administer the trust. "No one will deny that he may take
as a purchaser, or vendee, in his own right. If so, why may he not, in
42
contemplation of law, accept the legal title for the benefit of another?"
It is only by way of dictum that the court said: "Though no trustee
89 3 Pa. 436 (1846).
40 Id. at 441.
41 13 Pa. 488 (1850).
42 Id. at 494.
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were named, the trust itself would not be permitted to fall, for chancery
would interpose a trustee to sustain it, when necessary." 43
In Rixford v. Zeigler,44 the owner of certain land deeded it to the
Roman Catholic Church Community "for school and church purposes."
The said church community was an unincorporated association for the
purpose of religious worship. Neither the church community, nor any
of its members, nor any person claiming to act for it, ever took possession of the property or made use of it. It was held that the donor remained the legal and equitable owner of the land. It seems that
according to this case where property is deeded to an unincorporated
association for a charitable purpose,"a charitable trust does not arise
until the property has been used for the indicated purpose. "But noth' 45
ing of the kind occurred in the case at bar.
In Rayhol Co. v. Holland,46 a husband and wife received certain
land and a building bought and paid for by their respective parents
subject to certain conditions which were-set forth in a written memorandum signed by them. The conditions were that the property held
by them as tenants in common should be transferred to a trust company in trust for use of the husband and wife for life with remainder
to their surviving child or children and, in the event of their death
without surviving child or children, for sale of the property and division of the proceeds to their respective parents in proportion to the
amount of their contribution. The husband and wife also agreed that
a formal deed of trust embodying these terms should be prepared and
signed, but because of the refusal of the trust company selected by
them to act as the trustee the deed was never executed. The husband
later assigned his interest in the property to another. In a suit for
partition by the husband's assignee, the court held that the memorandum signed by the couple was a complete declaration of trust leaving
only for future action the execution of a formal document designed
to carry it into effect. Although the trust company refused to act this
would not prevent the memorandum from constituting a trust. It must
be pointed out that the memorandum by the couple was itself a sufficient agreement to create a trust supported by consideration. The conveyance of the land to the couple as tenants in common is sufficient
consideration for the grantee's agreement to appoint a trustee to hold
the property for the intended purposes.
4
44
45

Id. at 494.

88 P. 1092 (Cal. 1907).
Id. at 1094.
46 148 A. 358 (Conn. 1930).
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In Baily v. Massinger,4 7 a woman executed a deed of conveyance of
all her right, title and interest in certain property under a contested
trustee." She subsequently
will to a named person "andbrought suit to set aside the deed, alleging, among other things, that
the deed was ineffective in creating a trust for want of a trustee. The
court held that a trust was created although no trustee was named in
the deed. It must also be pointed out that the deed was executed for a
sufficient consideration: probate of the contested will and release of
her liability on a note of which she was one of the makers.
CONCLUSION

As is shown at some length in the foregoing discussion, it is fairly
well settled by the decided cases that where there is an initial want of
trustee the rule that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee does not
operate as against the grantor himself or his transferee unless one of
the following situations appears:
1. there is consideration to support the intended conveyance, or
2. even in absence of consideration, there are circumstances:
(a) indicating the donor's intent that his failure to appoint a
trustee does not prevent the trust from arising, as where
he intends to act as trustee pending the appointment of a
trustee or where he authorizes another to appoint a trustee,
or
(b) justifying the grant of equitable relief, as where the intended beneficiary has changed his position in reliance
upon the gift.
The results reached by the courts in the foregoing cases are sound.
On the basis of the decided cases it seems that the courts have not yet
come to accept the broad rule of Section 32(2) of the Restatement.
Where there is an initial failure of a trustee, the conveyance is ineffective except in special circumstances. The conveyance is ineffective since
there is no grantee-trustee, and the property remains in the grantor.
In such a case there is at most a promise to convey the property in
trust. Is this promise binding? Pomeroy answered the question in the
following words:
All agreements, so far as the binding efficacy of their promises is
concerned, must be referred to one or the other of three causes,47 57 A2d 232 (N.J. 1948).
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a valuable consideration, a mere voluntary bounty, or the performance of a moral duty. The first alone is binding at law, and enables the promisee to enforce the obligation against the promisor.
The second, while the promise is executory, is a mere nullity,
both at law and in equity. The third constitutes the meritorious
or imperfect consideration of equity, and is recognized as effective
by it within very narrow limits, although not at all by the law.
While this species of consideration does not render an agreement
enforceable against the promisor himself, nor against anyone in
whose favor he has altered his original intention, yet if an intended
gift based upon such meritorious consideration has been partially
and imperfectly executed or carried into effect by the donor, and
if his original intention remains unaltered at his death, then equity
will, within certain narrow limits, enforce the promise thus imperfectly performed, as against a third person claiming merely by
operation of law, who has no equally meritorious foundation for
his claim. The equity thus described as based upon a meritorious
consideration only extends to cases involving the duties either of
charity,
of paying creditors, or of maintaining a wife and chil4
dren.

We have seen that the cases are in full agreement with Pomeroy's
views. If there is sufficient consideration for the conveyance, however
ineffective, it is clear that a binding contract arises. 4 9 The only questions which might arise would be whether the contract is specifically
enforceable if the legal remedy is adequate and whether it is enforceable at all in jurisdictions where a third party beneficiary is not entitled to enforce it. If the property is conveyed as a gift or "as a mere
voluntary bounty," and the conveyance is ineffective because of want
of a trustee, a court of equity will not compel the donor to complete
the gift unless the beneficiary, in reliance upon the gift, so changes
his position that it would be inequitable to preclude him from obtaining the property. 50 If, however, the donor dies without having altered
his original intention of making a gift, and if the intended gift is for
the benefit of a charity or of persons who are the natural objects of
his bounty, by the great authority in this country the court has the
power to appoint a trustee and to compel his heirs or next of kin to
transfer the property to the appointed trustee. In other words, the
result is that although the donor holds the property free of trust during
his lifetime, his heirs are chargeable as constructive trustees.
48 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 588 (5th ed. 1941).

49 Rayhol Co. v. Holland, 148 A. 358 (Conn. 1930); Baily v. Massinger, 57 A.2d 232
(N.J. 1948).
50 Rixford v. Zeigler, 88 P. 1092 (Cal. 1907); Kirk v. King, 3 Pa. 436 (1846).
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